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Abstract—Malware is software which was invented and meant for
doing harms on computers. Malware is becoming a significant threat
in computer network nowadays. Malware attack is not just only
involving financial lost but it can also cause fatal errors which may
cost lives in some cases. As new Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)
emerged, many people believe this protocol could solve most
malware propagation issues due to its broader addressing scheme. As
IPv6 is still new compares to native IPv4, some transition
mechanisms have been introduced to promote smoother migration.
Unfortunately, these transition mechanisms allow some malwares to
propagate its attack from IPv4 to IPv6 network environment. In this
paper, a proof of concept shall be presented in order to show that
some existing IPv4 malware detection technique need to be
improvised in order to detect malware attack in dual-stack network
more efficiently. A testbed of dual-stack network environment has
been deployed and some genuine malware have been released to
observe their behaviors. The results between these different scenarios
will be analyzed and discussed further in term of their behaviors and
propagation methods. The results show that malware behave
differently on IPv6 from the IPv4 network protocol on the dual-stack
network environment. A new detection technique is called for in
order to cater this problem in the near future.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Pv6 is a new protocol which was invented initially to
overcome the issue of IP address depletion in IPv4 network
environment. Moreover, this new protocol also offer many
other advantages compares to the existing IPv4 protocol [1-3].
Although IPv6 offers a lot of benefits, still many users are
reluctant to migrate from IPv4 to IPv6 fully due the level of
service offers in IPv6 is still not as good as in IPv4. Since
IPv4 addresses are facing depletion, migrating to IPv6 is
eventually inevitable [4, 5]. Hence, transition mechanisms
have been introduced to promote the migration from IPv4 to
IPv6. These IPv4 to IPv6 transition mechanisms are
techniques which can be used to communicate nodes from
different IP protocols. Unfortunately, these mechanisms allow
malware to propagate its attack from IPv4 to IPv6 network
environment.
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The malware was originally intended to attack IPv4
network which it uses IPv6 protocol to propagate the malware
attack. This issue is becoming worse since many network
administrators do not aware of IPv6 existence in their network
as the IPv6 has an auto configuration features [6].
Malware is software which is developed and designed to do
harm on computers. Malware is becoming a significant threat
on computer network nowadays. Surveys show that malware
not only just involving financial lost, but it also can cause fatal
errors which may cost lives in some cases [7, 8]. Currently,
there are 250 malware variants coming into computer network
environment every day[9]. These so called new age malwares
are innovated from the existing malware. These malwares are
modified and some modules are added in order to avoid being
detected by existing malware detection techniques.
The objective of this paper is to show the concept that
existing IPv4 intrusion detection techniques need to be
improvised in order to detect malware activity in dual-stack
network environment more efficiently.
In the following sections, some related works will be
discussed and followed by the methodology used in this
experimental research. The experimental design will be
clarified and some result and analysis will be elaborated.
Finally, the conclusion and future work will be stated towards
the end of this paper.
II. STATE OF ART
A. IPv4 to IPv6 Transition Mechanisms
There are two transition mechanisms as stated in RFC 4213
which was revised from RFC 2893 namely Dual-ip layer and
tunneling IPv4 over IPv6. In this study, the dual ip layer also
known as dual-stack technique will be used. This technique is
the most straight forward technique to be implemented. Each
host and router is using both IPv4 and IPv6 protocols. In this
technique, the transition process is transparent to the end
users. The users will not realize which protocol they are using
as both these protocols are enabled all the time. If they are
using IPv4 application then the node will be using IPv4
address and protocol and vice versa. The advantage of this
technique are stable and easy to be implemented compares to
other techniques [10]. Fig. 1 shows how dual-stack
implemented on each node.
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Fig. 1 Dual-Stack transition mechanism architecture
Fig. 1 shows the architecture of dual-stack transition
mechanism. If a node communicates in IPv4 then it will use
same physical and mac layer addresses. But then it will start
use IPv4 address and protocols towards to IPv4 application
layer and vice versa with IPv6 protocol.
B. Malware Propagation
Malware are represented by several forms namely virus,
Trojan, spyware, adware and worms [11, 12]. Each of these
forms has different characteristics once it is infected a
network. Their method of propagation also varied including
transfer memory sticks, peer-to-peer files download, sharing
file and so forth. Based on malware characteristics, worm is
capable to be modeled as its propagation did not need any
human intervention [13].
The worm scanning methods can be divided into three
categories as defined by [14] 1) naïve random scanning, 2)
sequential scanning and 3) localized scanning. The naïve
random scanning method has pre-defined target IP addresses
without concerning about the victim’s network configuration.
Meanwhile, Sequential scanning method is defined to search
for vulnerable hosts through the nearest IP address space
based on the infected host configuration. Whereas, localized
scanning method will search for vulnerable hosts in the local
network by using the network information gained from the
infected before the worm initiates its attack.
In this study, two real worms were released on the testbed
namely Nimda and Sasser. Although these worms were
considered obsolete, these worms are still sufficient enough to
be used to prove our concept that native IPv4 malwares still
hunt for IPv6 addresses. The main reason these worms were
chosen is because these worms targeted victims’ IP addresses
were not pre-defined but rather randomly assigned based on
MAC information from the infected node to launch their
attack [15, 16]. Hence, if IPv6 protocol is available then these
worms will craft IPv6 packets to launch its attack to IPv6
network. With some modification made on the existing
worms, probably IPv6 network can be easily penetrated by
this type of worms.
C. Existing Intrusion Detection Technique
Intrusion detection plays important role to accommodate
defense line for a network from being exposed by malicious
users and incapacity of operating system to provide minimal
protection from variety of attack attempts [17]. In this case,
intrusion detection can be used as a form of defense line from
worm infection. Many studies have been conducted to propose
solutions to detect intrusion activities occurred on a network.
However, many of these studies were conducted by using IPv4
network traffic dataset. Some features used to detect intrusion
in IPv4 perhaps need to be improvised as a same attack used
different methods in IPv6 network environment.
In this study, the features which will be emphasized are
only 3 namely IP address, Protocol and Number of packets in
a time. In Table I, some conducted studies were using these 3
features were used in developed their detection model.
TABLE I
IPV4 DETECTION TECHNIQUES USING THREE FEATURES
Authors IP
address
Protocol
Type
Number of
Packets
Sangkatsanee, 2011 [18] ? ?
Antonis, 2010 [19] ?
Li, 2009 [20] ? ?
Faizal, 2009 [21] ? ?
Labib, 2002 [22] ? ?
Table I shows some studies conducted in intrusion detection
were using IP address, Protocol Type and Number of packets
in a time as a part of features used in constructing their
detection model based on IPv4 dataset. In this study, these
features will be used as comparison of the infection method
between IPv4 and IPv6 protocols after a network being
infected by a worm.
D. IPv6 Datasets
For the past few years, many studies were conducted on
forecasting worm propagation on a network. Most of these
studies proposed models based on mathematical theory. Su
[23] in her papers has mentioned a few models of worm
propagation  namely Simple Epidemic Model (SEM),
Kermack-Mckendrick Model (KM), Two Factor Model
(TFM). These models were novel models produced in
epidemiology research. In the same paper, Su also improvised
TFM and proposed worm propagation model called Three
Layer Worm Propagation Model (TLWM). Meanwhile,
Okamura applied Morkovian model method to propose his
kill-signal models [24]. Based on our observation, these
models were more generic and assuming the worm
propagation was not under the influence of neither IPv4 nor
IPv6 network environment. Hence, these studies were
neglecting IP protocol in constructing their models.
Some other models developed were focusing on IPv6
network environment. Kamra [5] is taken DNS service into its
consideration on developing his model. The result was gained
from mathematical simulation. In the meantime, Ting [25]
was using a testbed in her study to model worm propagation
on dual-stack network environment. However, the testbed was
just used to identify seed value of worm propagation.
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Later, the seed value was used in her simulation to get the
propagation model on dual-stack network environment. As the
result, the propagation model was not exclusively constructed
based on the testbed environment.
Based on our literature findings, most of worm propagation
models were constructed by using mathematical simulation.
These studies help us on understanding the basic
understanding about the overall issue. Not many worm
propagation in IPv6 studies were conducted in real life
environment due to lack of IPv6 datasets and lack of resources
to do so. Hence, this study tries to reduce the gap by using a
real hardware and genuine malware to be released to observe
its behavior on real dual-stack network environment.
Many researchers agree that a testbed is needed for further
IPv6 network investigation [26-28]. Not many IPv6 worm
detection studies were conducted in IPv6 network
environment. The main reason is because it is not easy to
gather a data to be used in analyzing IPv6 traffic pattern.
Based on our knowledge, the only anonymity IPv6 data
available is at Caida [29]. This data is consisting of a real
packet captured in IPv6 network environment.  Nevertheless,
before this data are used for further analysis, it is better to
have a small dataset of IPv6 which can help us have solid
fundamental knowledge about IPv6 traffic pattern about
malware propagation on dual-stack network. Hence, a fully
functional IPv4/IPv6 network testbed have to be designed and
implemented to study about worm behavior in dual-stack
network environment.
III. METHODOLOGY
In the direction of concluding the result, a sequence of work
flow as a process of malware analysis has been designed as in
Fig. 2.
Fig. 2 shows the process flow of analyzing malware
behavior in dual stack network environment. This process flow
was innovated from process flow for malware behavior
analysis proposed by Zolkipli [30].
Since malware attack is extremely hazardous, a testbed was
designed and implemented in order to test the malware
behavior on dual-stack network environment. This testbed is
used to ensure the malware just propagate in isolated network
environment and to avoid malware migration to the real live
network. The testbed design for this study can be found in Fig.
3.
Before the process begin, a clean testbed needs to be ready.
This stage is the most crucial stage as this affects the final
result for this test. Some malware are really hard to be cleaned
because after it infected a computer, it may remain in the
computer’s memory even after the malware was cleaned by
using the antivirus software. Hence, it is vital to cleaned
thoroughly each node including formatting all computers
involved. The switch and router used also need to be cleaned.
All configurations have to be deleted and restored as it just
being used for the first time.  Before the malware is being
released, all nodes connectivity must be tested to ensure
everything is working well as it is expected. This process must
be executed every time before a new scenario is taken place.
Although process is very time consumption, but the process
cannot be neglected as this will influence the final result of this
study.
Fig. 2 Malware analysis process flow
After the testbed is ready, sniffer node is started to capture
idle network traffic log. After 10 minutes, the sniffer tool is
stopped and the log is saved for further analysis. Next step, the
malware was released at once. Then, again the sniffer tool is re-
activated to capture all packets through the gateway router.
The gateway router is important in this experiment is
because it simulates as if this environment is accessible to the
other networks. Therefore, the network design is able to
deceive the malware to launch its attack to broader scale rather
than local area network only. After 10 minutes, the sniffer tool
is stopped and then the log is saved for further analysis.
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The same scenario using the same malware is repeated three
times. Each traffic log is saved and all logs are combined in the
analysis stage.
On the traffic behavior analysis stage, all the data are being
analyzed both individually and combine all together. The main
elements used in this analysis stage are the frequency packet
released and protocol used by both IP protocols. This
information is extracted from the saved traffic logs.
Finally after all data being analyzed, the findings and
outcomes are documented in a statistical report. Some figures
have been presented to aid readers to appreciate about the
whole idea of this study. A study shows that the IPv4 malware
still can survive in IPv6 network environment [13]. However,
this study will show whether IPv4 malware could migrate from
IPv4 to IPv6 network environment via a transition mechanism.
Towards the end of this paper, the result will prove whether
this issue is valid or not.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The objective of this experiment is to analyze how IPv4
malware behave in dual-stack network environment. This
experiment was conducted on isolated testbed environment to
ensure the malware will not propagate into real live network. In
the direction to prove the concept of this study, two malware
have been selected to be used in this study, namely, Nimda
variant E (Nimda.E), and Sasser variant B (Sasser.B). These
worms were selected due to their special feature that can
randomly assign targeted victims’ IP addresses based on MAC
information from the infected node. Each worm was released in
different scenario to make certain each worm would not affect
each other. Each data from each scenario will be repeated three
times as being practiced by previous researchers their study[31,
32]. The duration of data collection of each scenario is ten
minutes. The network layout of the designed testbed can be
found in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3 is about the network layout of the testbed used in this
experiment. This designed was innovated from a study
conducted by [33] where almost a similar study was conducted.
Each node is configured as stated in the Figure 3. Node 1 will
be installed with a packet sniffer tool and this node will capture
all traffic through the router gateway link. Switch also being
configured so that each packet going through router gateway
link is copied and send to Node1 to be collected. Node 2 and
Node 3 work as client in a dual-stack network environment. On
each scenario, malware is released on Node2. Some loopback
is configured in the router to simulate as if this router is
connected to other IPv4 and IPv6 networks.
Fig. 3 Testbed network layout
The procedure of this experiment is as the following:
S1.All computers, a switch and a router are cleaned. All
configurations into those computers, the router and the
switch are restored. The connectivity of each node is
tested to ensure everything is working as expected
S2.Leave the computers for two minutes to ensure the
network traffic has become stable.
S3.The network sniffer tool is activated to capture idle
network traffic pattern.
S4.After 10 minutes, the sniffer tool is stopped and the
log is saved.
S5.Just after that, the malware is released from Node 2.
S6.The network sniffer tool is restarted to capture the
packet through the gateway link.
S7.The duration of each scenario will last for 10 minutes.
S8.Plug out all cables connected to computer to stop the
experiment session and save the network traffic log from
Node1 for further analysis.
S9.Before starting the next experiment session, all
computers must be formatted. The switch and the router
must be reloaded with the original configuration to ensure
it is free from malware infection in operating system and
in its memory.
V. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
In this analysis, the protocol used in each scenario will be
identified and the frequency of all packets going through the
gateway within one second will be visualized. Since this
experiment is using a dual-stack network environment, both
IPv4 and IPv6 protocols will be analyzed.  As discussed in the
previous section, at this point of time there are 3 scenarios,
namely, an idle network, a nimda infection and a sasser
infection network. Each scenario also has 3 different datasets.
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Each dataset on each scenario will be analyzed individually.
After all data being analyzed, the combination of results on
each scenario will be presented towards the end of this section.
Fig. 4: Frequency number of packet sent in one second in idle
network
A. Idle Network Scenario
This data are captured within 10 minutes duration after a
network is considered stable. In this scenario, there is no
specific activity but still some packets are still flowing out and
being captured. Typically, Spanning-Tree Protocol (STP) and
Dynamic Trunking Protocol (DTP) are being used for network
convergence.
Fig. 4 shows the frequency of number of packets being
released within one second during an idle network. This figure
is extracted from 3 datasets. The line with triangle symbol
represents data from DataSet 1. The line with circle symbol
represents data from DataSet 2 while DataSet 3 is presented by
the line with diamond symbol. Based on this data, the data
captured are consistent among the three datasets. It can be
assumed that the traffic pattern in idle network is following
exponential distribution. The mode is only one packet released
on the network within one second. The frequency goes down
exponentially as the number of packet released per second
increased.
B. Nimda Infection Scenario
In this second scenario, a Nimda worm will be released on
the testbed. These data are captured from 10 minutes duration
after a network is considered infected by the worm. The
following figure shows data captured in three different
scenarios.
Fig. 5 Frequency number of packet released in one second in nimda
infected network
Fig. 5 shows the frequency of the number of packets being
released within one second after the network being infected by
a nimda worm. This figure is extracted from three datasets.
The line with triangle symbol represents data from dataset1
(Nimda D1). The line with circle symbol represents data from
dataset2 (Nimda D2) while dataset3 (Nimda D3) is presented
by the line with diamond symbol. The data represent the
combination of both IPv4 and IPv6 network traffic on the
dual-stack network testbed. Later, data from the three dataset
will be combined. Then, the data will be classified based on
the protocol used either IPv4 or IPv6 protocol for further
analysis.
Fig. 6 Extracted data from the combined nimda infected datasets
Fig. 6 shows the extracted data from the combined data
from 3 datasets as depicted in Figure 5 according to respective
protocols.
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From the combined data, IPv4 and IPv6 packets have being
distinguished to analyze packets on different network
protocol. The line with diamond symbol represents data for
packets being released by using the IPv6 protocol. The line
with circle symbol represents data from packet being released
by using the IPv4 protocol while the idle network is
represented by the line with triangle symbol. The idle network
line is represented the combined idle network datasets.
From the Fig. 6, after a network being infected by a nimda
worm it can be seen that the highest frequency of IPv6 packets
being released is 5 packets per seconds. In terms of protocols,
most of IPv6 packets were using UDP protocols such as Link-
local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and DNS.
Meanwhile, the highest frequency of IPv4 packets being
released is actually 1 packet per second. However, there is
another peak which is 6 packets per seconds. This second peak
shows there is a possibility of worm activity as this pattern
was not occurred in the idle network dataset. In terms of
protocols, most of IPv4 packets were using TCP protocols
such as HTTP, and Server Message Block (SMB).
When comparing both IPv4 and IPv6 protocols, the
detection of worm activity in IPv6 should be different from
IPv4 network environment. The protocol used is different as
well as the highest frequency of packet being released by each
IP protocols are also different. Notice that the peak of
Nimda_IPv6 is significantly high. This is probably because of
the frequency packets are represented by the combination of
packets being released for network convergence and being
released by the worm itself.
Fig. 7 Frequency number of packet released in one second in Sasser
infected network.
C. Sasser Infection Scenario
In this third scenario, a Sasser worm will be released on the
testbed. These data are captured from 10 minutes duration after
a network is considered infected by the worm. The following
Fig. 7 shows data captured in three different scenarios.
Fig. 7 shows the frequency of number of packet released in
one second within after the network being infected by a sasser
worm. The line with triangle symbol represents data from
dataset1 (Sasser D1). The line with circle symbol represents
data from dataset2 (Sasser D2) while dataset3 (Sasser D3) is
presented by line with diamond symbol. In these data, both
IPv4 and IPv6 packets are being captured in the dual-stack
testbed. For further analysis, these three dataset were combined
and both IPv4 and IPv6 packets will be distinguished to
analyze each protocol individually. Fig. 8 shows the extracted
data from the combined sasser infected datasets.
Fig. 8 Extracted data from the combined sasser infected datasets
Fig. 8 shows the extracted data from the combined sasser
infected network datasets. In this figure, both IPv4 and IPv6
packets were isolated to analyze the protocol individually. The
line with diamond symbol represents data for packet being
released by using the IPv6 protocol. The line with circle
symbol represents data for packet being released by using the
IPv4 protocol while the idle network is represented by the thick
line with triangle symbol.
Based on Fig. 8, after a network being infected by sasser it
can be seen that the highest frequency of IPv6 packets being
released is 1 packet per second which is consistent with the idle
network scenario. At the same time, there is another peak point
which is 5 packets per seconds. This peak point possibly shows
there is an anomaly activities occurred in the network as the
second peak does not occur in the idle network scenario. In
terms of protocols, most of IPv6 packets were using ICMPv6
and UDP protocols such as Link-local Multicast Name
Resolution (LLMNR) and DNS.
Meanwhile, the highest frequency of IPv4 packets is 1
packet per seconds which is consistent with the idle network
scenario. Meanwhile, there is another peak point which is 9
packets per seconds. This peak point could represent an
anomaly activities occurred in the network as the second peak
does not occur in the idle network scenario.
In terms of protocols, most of IPv4 packets were using
ICMP and TCP protocols such as HTTP and Server Message
Block (SMB).
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When comparing both IPv4 and IPv6 scenarios, the
detection of worm activity in IPv6 should be different from
IPv4 network environment. The protocols being used are
different as well as the highest frequency of packet being
released by each IP protocols are also different.
VI. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Based on result gathered from the experiment, it can be seen
that malware is behaving differently on different IP protocols.
Ideally, the number of packet being released on an idle network
follows an exponential distribution. However, once a network
is being infected by a worm, the frequency distribution of
packets changes accordingly. Both scenarios show that the
highest frequency of packets being released and the protocols
used by each IP protocol are different. The following table
shows the comparison between different scenarios:
TABLE II
COMPARISON BETWEEN NIMDA AND SASSER INFECTION SCENARIO
??????????
???????
???????????????
????????
????????????????
????????
IPv4 IPv6 IPv4 IPv6
?????????? 32 bits 128 bits 32 bits 128 bits
????? ????????
????
TCP
(HTTP &
SMB)
UDP
(LLMNR,D
NS)
TCP
(HTTP &
SMB)
UDP
(LLMNR,D
NS)
???????
?????????
??????
????????
6 pkts/sec 5 pkts/sec 9 pkts/sec 5 pkts/sec
Table II compares and summarizes the experimental results
from two different scenarios, namely, Nimda and Sasser
infection scenarios. From the table, the IP address used on both
protocols are different where the IPv4 protocol uses 32 bits
while the IPv6 protocol uses 128bits for IP addresses. What is
more, it can be seen that in both scenarios most of IPv4 packets
were using TCP protocols whereas IPv6 packets were using
UDP protocols. In terms of packet being released, the highest
frequency peak released in IPv4 is much higher compares to
IPv6 network environment. Based on these three observations,
we would like to recommend that the malware detection in
IPv4 network environment need to be improvised in order to
detect malware activities in either dual-stack or IPv6 network
environment more efficiently. The current malware detection
for IPv4 network will not do well in IPv6 network
environment.
VII. CONCLUSION
A broad use of IPv6 is eventually coming. Several transition
mechanisms are used to promote migration from IPv4 to IPv6
network environment. The implementation of transition
mechanisms need to be carefully designed as this study shows
that malware could use the transition mechanism as a
vulnerable point to propagate its attack. It can be concluded
that malware behave differently in different network
environment. Based on the experimental results, it has been
observed that three main features are used by some intrusion
detection techniques to construct their models are different
between IPv4 and IPv6 protocol.
Hence, the current detection techniques need to be
improvised in order to detect malware activities more
efficiently in either dual-stack or IPv6 environment. For future
work, the testbed network design will be extended and the use
of IPv6 packet generator tools will be more realistic to imitate
IPv6 network environment.
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